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Abstract
Increasingly, in regional agreements, large economies, e.g. U.S. and E.U., oﬀer lower trade
barriers in exchange for cooperation by small economies in environmental, intellectual property
and other issues. What is the eﬀect of such agreements on multilateral trade liberalization? We
show that, even in the absence of trade creation or diversion, such preferential agreements increase
the cost of multilateral tariﬀ reductions for the goods exported from small to large countries. This
occurs because multilateral tariﬀ reductions decrease the threat that large countries can use in
preferential agreements causing a loss in their bargaining power. The result is due to current
exceptions in the WTO to the most-favorite-nation rule which allow for lower than MFN tariﬀs, e.g.
art. XXIV and GSP. By explicitly modeling the interaction between preferential and multilateral
negotiations we analyze the eﬀects on multilateral tariﬀs and welfare of strengthening the MFN
rule and show that large and small countries may not prefer the same regime of rules.
JEL classiﬁcation: F13; F15; F18; F42; H77.
Keywords: Multilateral trade negotiations; most-favorite-nation; regional integration; cross-
border externalities; environment; labor standards; bargaining; repeated games.
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There has been an enormous proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in the last 20
years.1 An increasing number of the recent PTAs involve both developing and developed countries.
Another distinguishing feature of several recent PTAs is that large developed economies lower their
trade barriers in exchange for cooperation by small developing countries in non-trade issues such
as labor, environment and intellectual property. This is the case with the Eastern European and
Mediterranean agreements signed by the EU; the US agreements with Jordan, Mexico and other
Latin American and Caribbean countries; and the preferential treatment that the EU and the US
extend to most developing countries through the generalized system of preferences. We refer to this
type of PTAs as Large-Small PTAs (LSPTAs).2,3
Both the US and some EU members have demanded similar concessions on non-trade issues in
multilateral trade negotiations. This type of multilateral linkages was a contentious issue during the
last round of multilateral trade negotiations and an important cause for the failure to start a new
round in Seattle.4 Fear that such linkage will block further multilateral liberalization has prompted
suggestions that linkage should be pursued via preferential agreements if at all. However, if countries
pursue linkage via preferential agreements the incentives for multilateral liberalization can change.
Currently there is no analysis of the eﬀect of this type of preferential agreements on the multilateral
trading system and so it is unclear if they promote or hinder multilateral trade liberalization.5
A related question, whether PTAs are stumbling blocs towards multilateral trade liberalization,
1From 1948-94 there were 124 notiﬁcations to the WTO of distinct PTAs by its members. Since 1995 there have
been at least an additional 90. <http://www.wto.org/>
2World Bank (2000) and Perroni and Whalley (1994). The latter is particularly clear on this point:
“[T]hese new regional arrangements are the outcome of smaller countries with little negotiating power
seeking safe-haven trade arrangements with larger countries, primarily so as to make their access to large
markets more secure. In the resulting agreements, larger countries have been able to both extract a price
for their participation, largely in the form of non-trade concessions, as well as enhance their power in
bloc-wide negotiations.” (p.1)
3See Elliot (2000), Bayard and Elliot (1994) and UNCTAD (1998) for details on conditionality in the GSP program.
Perroni and Whalley (1994) and references therein provide details on conditionality in NAFTA whereas Winters (1993)
and Grilli (1997) address the EU’s Eastern European, Mediterranean and GSP programs.
4The Uruguay Round included a controversial agreement on Intellectual Property Rights which requires compliance
with internationally agreed principles under the threat of trade sanctions. In 1999 President Clinton advocated the use
of trade sanctions in the WTO to enforce core labor standards in an interview with the Seattle Post-Intelligence. For
this reason the “US media ... laid the blame for last week’s failed WTO meeting squarely on Bill Clinton’s doorstep,
accusing the president of mishandling Washington’s international trade strategy.” In : “US media blame Clinton for
failed WTO meeting”, Agence France Presse, December 5, 1999.
5This point has also been noted by trade lawyers in the context of the GSP but not yet analyzed, in the conclusion
of a chapter on trade and labor rights, Trebilcock and Howse (1999) assert that the GSP system is important in holding
back MFN concessions:
“The main impact of this lack of agreements [regarding labor rights in the context of the WTO] is that
1has been extensively analyzed but the results of that literature are not applicable here for two reasons.6
First, the focus has been on agreements between countries of similar size and development that were
common in the ﬁrst wave of PTAs in the 1950’s and 60’s. Second, the emphasis is on traditional
PTAs with reciprocal reductions in trade barriers that can lead to the creation or diversion of trade
from a more eﬃcient source towards the preferential partner. Empirically however, there is no
consensus on the importance of trade creation and diversion in recent PTAs.7 Yet trade creation
and diversion eﬀects are the major driving forces in existing theories of how PTAs aﬀect multilateral
liberalization.8 This is true even of the rare cases when domestic policies unrelated to trade have
been considered in the context of PTAs, as Panagariya notes in a review of the literature “Also
excluded from consideration are issues such as ... harmonization of domestic policies. Though these
issues ﬁgure in the current policy debate, they have not been seriously addressed in the theoretical
literature.” (2000, p.288).
We take these non-trade issues seriously and show that, even in the absence of trade creation or
diversion eﬀects, preferential agreements with non-trade objectives have an important eﬀect on the
multilateral trading system. In particular, we stress the following results. First, the current regime
of trading rules creates an incentive for large countries to maintain high multilateral tariﬀst ou s e
as a threat against small countries in LSPTAs. Second, alternative regimes can prevent this eﬀect if
they can be enforced, but simple changes in WTO rules such as banning LSPTAs may in fact lead to
even higher multilateral tariﬀs. Third, we endogenize the rules regime assuming it is chosen by the
large countries and show that it is not necessarily the one preferred by small countries.
some of the most powerful developed countries will continue to impose their own sanctions through the
withdrawal of GSP preferences- measures that are perfectly legal under existing multilateral trading rules.
By failing to respond to the demand for a social clause within the WTO, the Organization has simply
created an incentive for developed countries to make fewer oﬀers for tariﬀ cuts on an MFN basis in future
rounds of negotiations (especially on products of interest to developing countries), so as to preserve the
impact that comes from being able to grant—and with d r a w — G S Pt r e a t m e n t . T h i si sac o n s e q u e n c et h a t
free traders who are dogmatic opponents of a place within the WTO for permissible trade sanctions should
consider more carefully.” (p.462-463).
I thank Kyle Bagwell for suggesting this quote.
6This terminology was ﬁrst introduced and the issue systematically analyzed by Bhagwati (1991). See Winters
(1996) for a review.
7See for example Frankel (1997) and World Bank (2000). Most of the empirical work on creation and diversion eﬀects
has not focused speciﬁcally on Large-Small PTAs. In this regard the evidence from the eﬀects of GSP preferences on
developing countries’ exports is useful. According to Gillson (p.4,5) there is little evidence for the creation of trade
due to GSP preferences, one of the studies he surveys concludes that the “failure can be increasingly associated with
supply-side constraints amongst the GSP beneﬁciaries.”
8In contrasting the earlier wave of PTAs and the more recent one, Ethier states that: “...the Vinerian paradigm
of trade creation versus trade diversion drove analysis of the former, but it is by no means clear that it should drive
the analysis of the latter. Yet it has.” (1998, p. 1215) Fernandez and Portes (1998) discuss a number of diﬀerent
non-traditional returns to forming a PTA. A rare exception of a PTA model that explicitly addresses non-trade issues
is Schiﬀ and Winters (1997). They explicitly model the motivation for a PTA between two small, specialized countries
as arising from the increase in security (valued directly in the utility) due to higher imports from each other. However,
2We model two symmetric regional blocs, each containing a large and a small country. There
exist two externalities within each bloc. First, Large and Small’s governments provide a public good,
which has regional spillovers. Small places a negligible weight on that good, which results in a severe
underprovision from Large’s perspective. Second, there is a terms-of-trade externality; Large can use
at a r i ﬀ to depress Small’s export prices. The governments can internalize these eﬀects via an LSPTA
bargain where Large agrees to lower its tariﬀs on Small’s goods and in exchange Small increases
the provision of the public good. Cooperation is self-enforcing because countries interact repeatedly.
Importantly, we ensure that the LSPTA does not entail trade creation or diversion even though
similar goods are traded within and across regional blocs.
We ﬁrst show that, for given multilateral tariﬀs between large countries, an LSPTA provides a
strict welfare improvement for each member, even if Large has the bargaining power to make a take-
it-or-leave-it oﬀer to Small. This occurs since the LSPTA must be self-enforcing and it is a useful
benchmark because, while negotiating multilateral tariﬀs with the other bloc, large countries know
that if they subsequently propose an LSPTA it will be accepted.
Across blocs, there is a terms-of-trade externality between the large countries, which is addressed
by multilateral trade negotiations. Multilateral tariﬀs are set by large countries prior to the LSPTAs
and maximize their own joint welfare. Moreover, these tariﬀs must be self-enforcing. According to
the ﬁrst article of GATT/WTO, the Most-Favorite-Nation rule (MFN), a reduction in tariﬀs between
two members must be extended to all members. A strict commitment to MFN eﬀectively precludes
LSPTAs because the preferential tariﬀ must be extended to all WTO members. However, WTO
rules allow exceptions in the form of lower than MFN tariﬀs.9 More importantly, for our purposes,
the current exceptions imply that the lower bound for Large’s preferential tariﬀ on Small is zero and
the upper bound is the “MFN” or multilateral tariﬀ value so we refer to this regime of rules as an
LSPTA exception to MFN.
The ﬁrst important result is that under an LSPTA exception to MFN large countries choose a
positive multilateral tariﬀ even if they are suﬃciently patient to enforce free-trade between them.
because the countries modeled are small relative to the rest of the world, we cannot infer any implications from the
formation of such a PTA on other countries’ tariﬀs.
9Currently, three important provisions in WTO rules relating to trade in the context of PTAs constitute exceptions
to the MFN rule. For a PTA to be GATT-legal it must fall under either article XXIV, the Enabling Clause or article
V of GATS (the agreement on services). Article XXIV can be used by any country if: i) the tariﬀ reductions are
reciprocal and eventually zero, ii) the agreement covers substantially all trade and, iii) when a common external tariﬀ
is adopted, it does not exceed the average of the existing tariﬀ of the member countries in the preferential agreement
prior to it. These three conditions are waived for PTAs among developing countries under the Enabling Clause. Since
1979 the Enabling Clause also encompasses the GSP, which was originally granted as a 10-year waiver from MFN in
1971 (Jackson 1997, p. 164).
3Intuitively, reductions in the multilateral tariﬀ lower the threat that Large can use in the LSPTA and
therefore reduce its regional bargaining power. This cost explains the positive multilateral tariﬀ and
it has two sources. First, if the LSPTA is not duty-free then the reduction in the threat tariﬀ leads
to a reduction in the preferential tariﬀ, here the cost is lost tariﬀ revenue from Small. This eﬀect is
analogous to the standard MFN externality and not our main focus. Second, if the LSPTA is already
duty-free then a reduction in the multilateral tariﬀ forces Large to accept a lower provision of the
regional public good, which is more costly then the loss in tariﬀ revenue. This shows that an LSPTA
exception to MFN is a stumbling bloc to multilateral liberalization if the LSPTA is duty-free.
Note that we deﬁne the stumbling bloc eﬀect in terms of the increase in the multilateral tariﬀ
over and above that caused by the standard MFN externality to stress its novelty. Our result implies
that tackling non-trade issues through preferential agreements can actually bloc further reductions
of multilateral tariﬀs. Interestingly if the current WTO requirement that PTAs eliminate all internal
barriers were strictly enforced then only duty-free LSPTAs would exist and these are precisely the
ones that have the worst impact on multilateral trade liberalization according to our model.
The stumbling eﬀect is quantitatively important when Large places a high value on the public
good. If the LSPTA is duty-free then exogenous increases in that weight lead Large to increase the
multilateral tariﬀ in order for Small to increase the provision of the public good. This contains an
interesting testable prediction. Increases in the weight that Large places on the public good lead to an
increase of the multilateral tariﬀ of a good if it is imported from an LSPTA partner. Alternatively,
if we also model an (exogenous) gradual multilateral liberalization process, the prediction is that
multilateral liberalization is slower for goods imported from small LSPTA partners.
The stumbling eﬀect may help in explaining why large countries have such high trade barriers on
important exports from small developing countries. One common explanation is that the standard
MFN externality causes large countries to hold back MFN reductions in those goods. However, if
the exports from small countries are jointly small then the MFN externality cannot fully account for
the magnitude of those barriers. On the other hand the stumbling bloc eﬀect we analyze may be
important even for small levels of exports if large countries highly value the public good.
A typical standard used to evaluate the desirability of preferential agreements, or the rules regime
that permit them, is the eﬀect on the welfare of non-members. The stumbling bloc eﬀect has a negative
eﬀect on small non-members that export the set of goods in which the multilateral tariﬀ is higher.
Therefore, we analyze whether eliminating WTO articles that allow exceptions to MFN is suﬃcient
to eliminate the stumbling bloc eﬀect. That is we compare the multilateral tariﬀ chosen under the
4LSPTA exception regime and a regime of commitment to MFN that precludes LSPTAs. We show
that the stumbling eﬀect is indeed eliminated under the commitment regime if large countries are
suﬃciently patient. However, if the large countries are not suﬃciently patient this result can be
reversed.
When large countries are not suﬃciently patient the multilateral tariﬀ is determined by the
incentive constraints that balance the incentive to deviate from the multilateral agreement against
future losses from non-cooperation. Under commitment to MFN large countries threaten to revert to
non-cooperation in the multilateral tariﬀ if the other either increases that tariﬀ or sets a discriminatory
tariﬀ. But if they punish each other can they still enforce non-discrimination? To analyze this
we distinguish between two extreme cases: strong and weak commitment to MFN. Under strong
commitment to MFN non-discrimination can be enforced costlessly, so LSPTAs never take place.
Under weak commitment to MFN there is no instrument to enforce non-discrimination during
trade wars, at which time LSPTAs would take place. We can interpret weak commitment as the simple
elimination of WTO articles that allow exceptions to MFN. Strong commitment entails an additional
rule, such as allowing a third country to punish the warring parties if they also set discriminatory
tariﬀs. The three diﬀerent regimes, LSPTA exception, weak and strong commitment to MFN, lead
to diﬀerent incentive constraints and therefore diﬀerent levels of multilateral liberalization.
Our second main result is that the lowest sustainable multilateral tariﬀ under the exception is
lower than that under a regime of weak commitment to MFN when large countries are not suﬃciently
patient. Thus we can say that the LSPTA exception is a building bloc relative to weak commitment
to MFN. Brieﬂy, under weak commitment large countries do not sign LSPTAs while cooperating, but
do so if they ever enter a trade war. This possibility to sign a welfare improving LSPTA during a trade
war provides an extra incentive to deviate from the multilateral agreement under weak commitment.
Similarly the gains from cooperation are lower under weak commitment due to the absence of an
LSPTA.
We also show that the lowest sustainable tariﬀ under the exception can be higher than that
under strong commitment when large countries are not suﬃciently patient. This conﬁrms that the
stumbling bloc result can also hold when large countries are not suﬃciently patient. More importantly,
the contrasting results under weak and strong commitment to MFN provide a strong warning to
governments deciding to commit to MFN. Simply eliminating the current rules that allow exceptions
to MFN will actually lead to higher multilateral tariﬀs. But, with additional rules that credibly
sustain a strong commitment to MFN governments can enforce lower multilateral tariﬀs.
5The second typical standard used to evaluate the desirability of preferential agreements is their
eﬀect on the welfare of members. LSPTAs are welfare improving for both members at given mul-
tilateral tariﬀs. But if, as explained above, those tariﬀs are higher than under commitment which
regime is preferred by small and large countries and which is chosen? We assume that a regime of
rules is chosen in the initial stage of each period, that is prior to setting the multilateral tariﬀsa n d
forming LSPTAs, as shown in ﬁgure 1. Large countries choose the regime that maximizes their own
joint welfare. This captures the historic lack of participation by small developing countries not just
in multilateral tariﬀ reductions but also in setting WTO rules, which is one important complaint
driving the current push for the latest trade negotiations to be a “development” round.
Our model predicts that large countries choose the LSPTA exception regime over commitment to
MFN when suﬃciently patient. This is not surprising since in this case the only diﬀerence between
the two regimes is that commitment requires a non-discriminatory tariﬀ and therefore rules out
LSPTAs. Moreover, because large countries choose the multilateral tariﬀs to maximize their joint
welfare any negative eﬀects on each other from higher multilateral tariﬀs are fully internalized. The
model also predicts that large countries chose the exception regime over weak commitment if they
are not suﬃciently patient. Both of these predictions are reassuring since the exception regime is
indeed the status quo.
The ﬁnal important result is that small countries do not always prefer the exception regime.
More speciﬁcally, if the LSPTA is duty-free then there exist suﬃciently patient small countries that
prefer the commitment regime. Intuitively, when the LSPTA is duty-free the exception regime entails
higher multilateral tariﬀs, which has two opposing eﬀects. It beneﬁts Small because its exports enter
duty-free in Large’s market and receive the higher price that results from the tariﬀ increase. On the
other hand, the increase in the threat tariﬀ forces Small to increase its provision of the public good.
If Small is suﬃciently patient then Large extracts most of the gains from the LSPTA and we show
that the negative eﬀect dominates, so Small prefers the commitment regime. This is an example of
a potential cost to small countries from non-participation in the setting of multilateral trade rules.
We ﬁrst develop the regional blocs’ model. In section 3 we derive the equilibrium LSPTA policies
for given multilateral tariﬀs. Next we analyze multilateral trade liberalization, the role of LSPTAs
as stumbling blocs and whether alternative regimes remove that eﬀect. In section 5 we analyze the
eﬀects of deepening regional integration, extend the results to deal with global spillovers and derive
the preferred MFN regime for large and small countries. We discuss our conclusions in section 6. All
proofs are in the appendix.
62 A model of Large-Small PTAs
2.1 Economic structure of the regional blocs
There exist two symmetric regional blocs. Each bloc is composed of two economies, Large and Small,
where the names refer to the countries’ relative endowment of the (non-numeraire) traded goods.
Large’s bigger endowment is the basis for its dominating regional bargaining power. However, Small
must be important in the non-trade dimension; otherwise, Large would not seek its cooperation on
non-trade issues. Thus we assume that both countries have the same population to ensure that
Large places a non-negligible weight on those non-trade issues proportional to Small’s population,
e.g. human rights, labor rights or environmental externalities.
Each country, j = L, S, has a population of H individuals, each endowed with one unit of labor,
which is the only factor. The numeraire, n, is produced with labor, N = hn. In Large each individual
is also endowed with one unit of each of the non-numeraire goods i = l, l∗. In Small each individual









The subutility functions for the non-numeraire private goods, u, are twice continuously diﬀerentiable
and strictly concave. The subutility function for the public good, E,i s :
¯ Ψj(Ej,E\j) ≡ λjΨ(Ej)+αjλjΨ(E\j) αj,λj ≥ 0;Ψ0 ≥ 0;Ψ00 ≤ 0 (2)
The weight placed on the public good, λj, varies across countries.10 The public good has a regional
spillover if αj is positive. We can interpret E as public expenditures to address environmental
problems with cross-border spillovers or for enforcing certain laws, e.g. protecting human and labor
rights.11
For given prices and taxes the individual chooses the quantities of the private goods it consumes








i ≤ yj. Given the assumptions on the









10We also assume that Ψ(0) = 0;limE→0 Ψ
0(E)=∞ and limE→∞ Ψ(E) ≤ ¯ ψ. The boundary assumption ensures that
as long as the population in Small is suﬃciently large it is not exhausted in producing E so the wage is ﬁxed at one.
11S o m eo ft h e s ei s s u e sh a v eg l o b a le ﬀects. As we show in section 5.2 our results also hold when spillovers are global,
therefore the initial focus on regional spillovers is not restrictive.
7of each of the non-numeraire goods. Thus the individual’s indirect utility is:







where the last term represents consumer surplus from the non-numeraire goods.12 We make the
following assumptions regarding Small’s preferences. First, we are interested in the case where Large
places a higher weight than Small on the provision of the public good. Therefore, without loss of
g e n e r a l i t y ,w ef o c u so nt h ee x t r e m ec a s ew h e r eS mall places no weight on the public good. Second,
we want to ensure that no trade diversion or creation eﬀects take place due to the LSPTA even if
the same good is traded across regional blocs. As we show below, this requires a particular trade
pattern and a condition to obtain it is to assume that Small derives no utility from either good l or
l∗. Thus the indirect utility for individuals in Small is simply given by their income. An individual’s
income sources are the wage, the proceeds from the sale of the endowment and net taxes. Net taxes
are equal to the per capita tariﬀ r e v e n u e sa n dt h et a xu s e dt oﬁnance the public good, e.13
The government sets trade policy and supplies the public good in order to maximize domestic
aggregate welfare.14 The public good is produced using labor, Ej = bjh
j
e. We assume that the
population is suﬃciently large so that the numeraire is always produced in equilibrium, which ﬁxes
the wage at unity. Finally, the balanced budget condition implies that, in equilibrium, the amount
of public good provided is Ej = bjHej.15
The trade policy instruments available are speciﬁct a r i ﬀs on the imported (non-numeraire) goods.
The governments also decide on their trade policy strategy, namely whether to pursue LSPTAs and,
in the case of Large, multilateral trade agreements and their associated rules. Before addressing this
issue we analyze the trade pattern.
2.2 Trade pattern
The trade pattern for the non-numeraire goods is illustrated in ﬁgure 2. The two large countries have
similar endowments and therefore diﬀerences in demand determine their trade pattern. We label the
12Throughout we focus on a quadratic form of the sub-utility, u =( ac − c
2/2)/b, which gives rise to linear demand
curves and implies that υ =( a − bp)
2 /2b.












l /k + t
S − e
S in Small.
14If individuals in the same country had diﬀerent endowments we could easily provide a political economy motive for
the government’s use of trade policy. This would change the level of the tariﬀs set but not the qualitative results in
this paper since the main motivation for reciprocal trade agreements is the TOT externality, which is independent of
political economy motivations (Bagwell and Staiger 2000).
15All the tariﬀ revenue is distributed lump-sum and we assume that none of it can be used to ﬁnance the public good,
which maintains the two policies separable in the game that follows.
8good that Large has a stronger preference for as l,s oi ti m p o r t sl and exports l∗. Small countries value
only the numeraire good and therefore export their full endowment, H/k, to the large countries.16
In the absence of discriminatory tariﬀs a small country always exports to the large country in its
own bloc. However, when discriminatory tariﬀs are possible, Large could potentially set a relatively
higher tariﬀ on the exports of good l from Small, e.g. during a trade war, in which case Small
would sell in Large*. To rule out the possibility that Large* simultaneously imports and exports
an homogenous good, we assume that the trading costs between a small and a large country in the
opposite bloc are prohibitive. There is a compelling reason for this assumption as well as for the
endowment and preference structure: to neutralize any potential trade diversion and creation eﬀects
and isolate a distinct eﬀect of LSPTAs on multilateral tariﬀs.
Small countries do not set tariﬀs since they do not import the non-numeraire goods.17 Since
Small has no tariﬀ reductions to oﬀer to Large, the LSPTA consists of a tariﬀ reduction by Large on
Small’s exports in exchange for Small’s provision of the regional public good. Consequently, the only
direct eﬀect of the LSPTA on trade is to increase Small’s export price. Moreover, because Small’s
exports are perfectly inelastic, the price changes do not aﬀect the quantity exported. In sum the
LSPTA does not cause trade creation nor diversion.
To determine the equilibrium prices of l and l∗ we ﬁr s tn o t et h a tL a r g es e t sat a r i ﬀ τL and τm on
imports from Small and Large* respectively. The equilibrium domestic price in Large for its import,
pL












l − 1) for j = L, L∗ and MS
l ≡− H/k . A similar condition holds for l∗.T h e s e




). Note that these prices are not directly aﬀected by the preferential tariﬀ because the small
countries’ supply is perfectly inelastic. It is then simple to show that an increase in τm raises
16The balance of payments condition is satisﬁed through movements of the numeraire good.
17We can easily extend the model to provide a motivation for such tariﬀs. However, reductions in small countries’
tariﬀs are not an important part of the types of PTAs we analyze and therefore we choose not to model them. For
example, the GSP programs allowed by GATT do not require reciprocal trade concessions. However, “during the last
twenty-ﬁve years or so the experience of the GSP in the GATT system has been that for a number of reasons the
preference-granting national entities (i.e. the industrialized countries) often succumb to the temptation to use the
preference systems as part of ‘bargaining chips’ of diplomacy.” (Jackson 1997, p. 160) Also, trade liberalization by
the smaller less developed countries has mostly been a result of a shift in ideology from import substitution towards
unilateral liberalization rather than a result of reciprocal trade liberalization with developed countries. See for example
Ethier (1998) and Foroutan (1998, p.8) on Mexico, Israel and Turkey.
9pL
l whereas an increase in τm∗
lowers the price for Large’s exporters.18 We can now write the
governments’ objective functions in terms of the policy variables as follows.
WS(τL,e S,τm)=H(1 − eS +( pL
l (τm) − τL)/k) (5)
WL(τL,e S,τm,τm∗










l (τm))} − {MS
l τL + ML∗
l τm}
For Small the three terms in eq.(5) represent respectively the aggregate wage; the cost of producing
the public good and export revenue. For Large the terms in eq.(6) represent respectively the aggregate
wage; the cost of producing the public good; utility from the public good; surplus from good l∗; surplus
from good l and tariﬀ revenue.
3 Equilibrium analysis of LSPTAs
There exist two intra-bloc externalities. The ﬁrst arises through the public good and the second is
the terms-of-trade externality due to Large’s market power in trade. These externalities are typically
overcome through international self-enforcing agreements. We study such agreements in detail below.
First we examine the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium for the LSPTA recalling that the LSPTA takes
place after the multilateral tariﬀ has been set and therefore takes it as given.
3.1 Non-cooperative solution
Small’s supply of l is perfectly inelastic and it has no demand for the good, therefore Large can use a
tariﬀ that extracts all the surplus and Small will still export its full endowment.19 Small sets its e-tax












19The results below go through if Small has a positive and suﬃciently elastic demand for good l up to a maximum
price ¯ p. In that case Small exports all its endowment under a discriminatory tariﬀ equal to p
L − ¯ p.At a r i ﬀ higher than
p
L − ¯ p would lower Large’s welfare if Small’s oﬀer is suﬃciently elastic below ¯ p.N o t ea l s ot h a te v e ni fw ea l l o wS m a l l
to have access to an export tax in our current setup Small’s best-response to τ
NL is indeterminate, any non-negative
value for the export tax is a Nash equilibrium, including zero which is the value we implicitly assume.
10Nash equilibrium value for given multilateral tariﬀsi s : 20
τNL = pL(τm) (7)
eNS =0 (8)
In ﬁgure 3 point N represents the Nash equilibrium for these policies when Large is free to set a
discriminatory tariﬀ (below we analyze how the MFN rule aﬀects this). Small’s iso-welfare contour at
the Nash is labelled ¯ WNS and has a constant slope of −k, the ratio of Large to Small’s endowments.21
Small’s welfare increases as τL or eS are lowered, reaching the maximum at the origin. Large’s contour
is labelled ¯ WNL. Since Large’s welfare is quasi-linear in τL, increases in that tariﬀ simply generate
a vertical shift of Large’s contours until it imposes a tariﬀ equal to pL,a tw h i c hp o i n tS m a l ls t o p s
exporting the good. Large’s welfare is increasing in eS.
3.2 Bargaining solution to LSPTA
The Nash equilibrium for the LSPTA is constrained Pareto eﬃcient when countries cannot make
direct transfers nor exchange concessions across policies. Large would beneﬁt from an increase in eS,
but Small would lose because of the provision cost. Whereas a reduction in τL transfers tariﬀ revenue
from Large to Small. But, if exchanges can be made across the two issues, a Pareto improvement is
possible, as represented by the shaded area in ﬁgure 3.
Temporarily abstracting from enforcement constraints, the solution to an LSPTA resulting from
an eﬃcient bargaining process must lie on the locus TSTTL in ﬁgure 3. This locus represents the
set of Pareto eﬃcient solutions which improve on the Nash.22 The exact solution depends on the
particular bargaining concept and relative bargaining powers. We are interested in the extreme case
where Large has all the bargaining power. This is an important case empirically given the extreme
size asymmetries in recent LSPTAs and because we want to answer whether Small is strictly better
oﬀ with the LSPTA even if it has no bargaining power. If Large makes a take-it-or-leave-it (TOL)
oﬀer, the solution to the LSPTA is at TL, which leaves Small at its Nash welfare level.23
20The e−tax set by Large is independent of the remaining policies because of the separability of W
L. This and the
fact that Small does not value the public good imply that Large’s e−tax is irrelevant for our analysis.
21A reduction of τ
L by k increases Small’s export price by k and thus its export revenue increases by kH/k = H.
Since H is the aggregate cost of increasing e
S by one unit, the slope of the iso-welfare is −k.
22The segment TT
L traces out the points at which Large and Small’s iso-welfare contours are tangent. It is vertical
because changes in Large’s tariﬀ on Small have only tariﬀ revenue eﬀects, which are constant and therefore have no
impact on the slope of the iso-welfare curves.
23After discussing the accession policies in the context of NAFTA and the EU a recent World Bank report on
regionalism states that:
11Thus far we assumed that Large uses the Nash tariﬀ as the threat in the LSPTA. However, if both
countries are members of the WTO, there is an important constraint on the level of this threat tariﬀ,
which arises from one of the most important rules in the WTO. According to the most-favoured
nation rule (MFN) a country must extend the same tariﬀ on “like-products” to all WTO members.
If this rule is strictly enforced then Large cannot extend a preferential tariﬀ and LSPTAs are ruled
out. However, current WTO rules allow exceptions to MFN, such as GSP, which explicitly allows
large countries to oﬀer tariﬀs below MFN values. Since the upper bound tariﬀ is still tied to the
MFN value an LSPTA exception to MFN entails τL ≤ τm during periods of cooperation between
large countries. Therefore when LSPTAs are permitted the threat tariﬀ Large uses against Small is:
τT
n ≤ τm
= τNL = pL(τm)
if τm is set cooperatively and Small is a WTO member
otherwise
All our qualitative analysis still applies if we use the multilateral tariﬀ as the maximum threat point.
The basic intuition for the main results we derive below is now clearer. By reducing the multilateral
tariﬀ Large reduces the value of the threat tariﬀ it uses in the LSPTA, either directly when τT ≤ τm,
or indirectly when τT = τNL since a reduction in τm causes pL(τm) t of a l l . T h i sl o w e r sL a r g e ’ s
regional bargaining power and thus the LSPTA entails an extra cost of reducing the multilateral
tariﬀ.I nﬁgure 4 the locus 0TL0
TL traces out the eﬀect of changing this threat on the TOL LSPTA
solution. If the starting multilateral tariﬀ is equal to τNL the solution is at TL, as before. Reductions
in the multilateral tariﬀ reduce the threat tariﬀ, which initially simply reduce the preferential tariﬀ.
However, if the threat falls below τT0
the LSPTA will have a zero preferential tariﬀ and any further
reductions in τT allow Small to reduce its provision of the public good. This is the extra cost of
reducing multilateral tariﬀs that will drive the stumbling bloc eﬀect.24
“In practice, (...) any country is free to apply; but the price of entry is set separately for each entrant.
This can lead to asymmetric agreements in which beneﬁts to developing country candidates are reduced
and possibly appropriated by existing members through side conditions on issues such as the environment,
labor regulations, and rules of origin.” (2000, p.100)
Abrego et. al (1997) do not address preferential agreements but they estimate the gains relative to non-cooperation of
a Nash bargaining outcome in a 2-country general computable equilibrium model where a large country trades market
access for environmental protection provided by a small country.
24In an independent paper that addresses WTO accession Bagwell and Staiger (2001) argue that a similar mechanism
may explain why WTO members hold back tariﬀ reductions on goods exported by countries expected to accede to the
WTO.
123.3 Self-enforcing bargaining solution to LSPTA
Much like other international cooperative agreements, LSPTAs must be self-enforcing given the ab-
sence of a supra-national authority to punish a country if it does not comply. If the asymmetry in
bargaining power allows Large to make a TOL oﬀer then enforcement becomes a key issue. Intu-
itively, if the TOL solution TL can’t be directly enforced, then Small would accept the oﬀer, get the
higher export price in the ﬁrst period and deviate, that is never provide the public good, since it gains
nothing from cooperation. Thus the particular LSPTA solution just derived is not self-enforcing.
Cooperative self-enforcing agreements are well characterized by certain repeated games.25 We
analyze the self-enforcing bargaining solution to the LSPTA when Large makes a TOL oﬀer to Small
for given multilateral tariﬀs. We assume that governments observe each other’s actions at the end
of each period and focus on stationary subgame perfect equilibria. We adopt the simplest trigger
strategies that maintain such equilibria—inﬁnite Nash reversion. That is, after a deviation Small sets
eNS and Large sets τL at τT. The payoﬀs for each government are their respective welfare functions
discounted at the rates δj.26
More formally, Large makes a TOL oﬀer to Small specifying τL and eS for a given level of the
threat tariﬀ τT as well as τm, which may be identical in equilibrium. This oﬀer maximizes the
present discounted value of Large’s welfare subject to one incentive constraint for each country, ICj.
Since we focus on stationary strategies, we need only maximize welfare each period. Therefore, the
self-enforcing tariﬀ and e-tax for the LSPTA, are given by:




The incentive constraints require that the net gain from deviating in any one period, Ωj,m u s tn o t
exceed the discounted value of the net beneﬁt from future cooperation, δjωj/(1−δj).More speciﬁcally:
ωS ≡ WS(τL,e S,τm) − WS(τT,e NS,τm) (9)
ΩS ≡ WS(τL,e NS,τm) − WS(τL,e S,τm) (10)
25See for example Dixit (1987) , Bagwell and Staiger(1990) and Riezman (1991).
26We do not restrict the relative size of the discount factors. Note that when δ
L 6= δ
S there may be a motive for
intertemporal trading of payoﬀs( i fδ
L > δ
S the incentive is to have Small’s payoﬀs being relatively larger initially and
the opposite for Large). This suggests that it may be optimal to consider non-stationary strategies. However, simple
non-stationary strategies involving ﬁrst more cooperation by Large (until some period t) and then by Small would not
be optimal for Large. The reason is that, seen from period t, the policies must still be self-enforcing. If they are indeed
self-enforcing from t onwards then Large should have proposed those policies at the start and not at t because nothing
is diﬀerent at t (except for the history of play). So we focus on stationary strategies.
13ωL ≡ WL(τL,e S,τm,.) − WL(τT,e NS,τm,.) (11)
ΩL ≡ WL(τT,e S,τm,.) − WL(τL,e S,τm,.) (12)
The solution to the LSPTA problem is as follows. In a self-enforcing LSPTA Large can no longer
leave Small at the Nash welfare level, since if Small does not gain from cooperating then the only
self-enforcing e-tax is zero. In ﬁgure 5a, IC
j represents the incentive frontier for country j,i . e .t h e
combinations of τL and eS that leave j indiﬀerent between cooperating and deviating. As we just
argued, IC
S is interior to Small’s iso-welfare line at the Nash, ¯ WNS,s oTL is not self-enforcing. The
incentive frontier for Large holds with equality at τL=τT and is ﬂatter than its iso-welfare curves.
Thus the shaded area between Large and Small’s incentive frontiers represents the set of self-enforcing
LSPTAs that improve on the Nash. Moreover, since Large makes a TOL oﬀer, Small’s IC must bind
so the solution is on IC
S,o t h e r w i s eL a r g ew o u l do ﬀer a higher tariﬀ or demand a higher eS.
The LSPTA is duty-free as illustrated by point B in ﬁgure 5b if Large is suﬃciently endowed
relative to Small, that is when k is suﬃciently large, as we show in the appendix. It is also possible
to show that the LSPTA is duty-free if Large places a high weight on the public good or the spillover,
α, is important since Large is then willing to give up all the tariﬀ revenue for even a small increase in
eS. If Large is not suﬃciently endowed we obtain one of two interior solutions. First, if Large’s IC
does not bind then the solution is at point BI in ﬁgure 5a where the MRS of the policies in Large’s
welfare and the MRS of the policies in enforcement for Small are equated. Otherwise the solution
is at the intersection of IC
L and IC
S (not depicted). Subsequent results depend on whether the
LSPTA is duty-free so the proposition below summarizes the alternative solutions.
Proposition 1 (Self-enforcing LSPTA bargaining solutions):
The self-enforcing LSPTA (TOL) bargaining solution for a threat of τT is (τL = τB(τT),e S =
eB(τT)),w h e r eeB(τT)=δS
k (τT − τB(τT)) and













δS (IC L does not bind) or












δS (IC L binds)
Having established the alternative solutions to the LSPTA we note its welfare impact on the
members.
14Proposition 2 (Welfare eﬀect of LSPTA for given multilateral tariﬀs):
For given multilateral tariﬀs, δS ∈ (0,1) and δL ∈ (0,1), a self-enforcing LSPTA is strictly welfare
improving for both members relative to no LSPTA even if Large has all the bargaining power and
makes a TOL oﬀer to Small.
It was obvious from ﬁgure 3 that a Pareto improving area exists. However, in the absence of
enforcement problems, this area includes LSPTAs which are not strictly welfare improving for both
countries, e.g. Large’s TOL oﬀer at TL.A si sc l e a rf r o mt h es h a d e da r e ai nﬁgure 5 such LSPTAs
are ruled out by enforcement constraints if countries discount the future. This is important because
it ensures that Small does not refuse Large’s proposal for a self-enforcing LSPTA. Thus, if Large
countries chose a regime of trade rules that allows LSPTAs, it is reasonable for them to negotiate
their multilateral tariﬀs assuming that subsequently each will sign a self-enforcing LSPTA.
We now model multilateral liberalization to show how LSPTAs lead to positive multilateral tariﬀs
and analyze whether alternative regimes can avoid or mitigate this.
4 Multilateral trade liberalization
4.1 Structure and timing of MTL
LSPTAs have taken place in the context of broad multilateral trade liberalization governed by
GATT/WTO rules. Much of this liberalization occurs between large countries and follows the prin-
cipal supplier rule. That is, if country A is the biggest exporter to B of a given product then B
proposes a tariﬀ reduction to A on that product in exchange for A’s tariﬀ reduction on one (or
several) of B’s exports. After agreeing on a reciprocal tariﬀ reduction large countries must extend it
to all other WTO members which export similar goods due to the MFN rule. So, because of MFN,
countries A and B commit to binding their maximum tariﬀs on imports from other countries at the
level negotiated between themselves. We now address this eﬀect of binding the maximum tariﬀ and
therefore “tying one’s hands” in terms of the maximum threat that can be used in an LSPTA. More
speciﬁcally, we answer the following question. Are LSPTA exceptions a building bloc or a stumbling
bloc towards further MTL?27
27We do not attempt to model why, when there are only two large countries, they choose to enforce an MFN rule
vis-a-vis small countries. We simply take this feature of the trading system as given. As Horn and Mavroidis (p.37)
point out in their review of theoretical models of MFN: “a major weakness with the literature is the fact that there
does not appear to exist models where MFN is an endogenous feature of an agreement.” An exception to this is Cepi
and Ludema (2001). See also Ghosh et. al (1998) for numerical simulation results on the value of MFN for developing
countries.
15The timing of agreements in our model captures the fact that regional agreements are typically
“easier” to reach than multilateral ones. We implicitly assume that regional negotiation costs are
negligible relative to multilateral ones, which implies that even after multilateral trade negotiations
a country can sign an LSPTA. Thus LSPTAs should be modelled as the last stage of the game. As
illustrated in ﬁgure 1, the ﬁrst stage involves a choice of rules, which we analyze in section 5. Given
the choice of rules, the second stage involves the choice of multilateral tariﬀ levels and the third stage
the LSPTA. This three-stage game takes place each period and is indeﬁnitely repeated.
We model MTL as the self-enforcing solution to a repeated game. Large countries choose the
multilateral tariﬀs to maximize their joint welfare subject to incentive constraints that ensure neither
prefers to deviate from the agreement. We focus on subgame perfect Nash equilibria sustained
by trigger strategies that involve inﬁnite Nash reversion. The exact trigger depends on whether
governments choose to have an LSPTA exception to the MFN rule or commit to MFN, that is to a
non-discriminatory tariﬀ. Below we provide the exact trigger strategies and the resulting incentive
constraints. Before doing so we derive the equilibrium multilateral tariﬀs for the case when the large
countries are suﬃciently patient so that their incentive constraints for the MTL do not bind. This
isolates the eﬀect of the LSPTA on multilateral tariﬀs and points to a potential solution.
4 . 2 L S P T A sa ss t u m b l i n gb l o c st oM T L
Given the symmetry between large countries it is suﬃcient to focus on one country and, since the
problem is stationary we can focus on maximizing welfare each period. Thus, after taking the
symmetry into account, the cooperative multilateral tariﬀs set under the LSPTA exception, τEXm,
and commitment to MFN, τCm, are respectively:
τEXm ≡ argmax
τc {WL(τL = τB(τT),e S = eB(τT),τc,τm∗ = τc,.):ICEX;τL ≤ τc} (13)
τCm ≡ argmax
τc {WL(τL,e S =0 ,τc,τm∗ = τc,.)) : ICC;τL = τc} (14)
The constraint imposed by the commitment to MFN is a non-discriminatory tariﬀ, τL = τm,t h u sn o
LSPTA can take place and Small does not provide the public good. With the LSPTA exception large
countries can not set a tariﬀ on Small higher than the multilateral tariﬀ and thus a threat to Small
any higher than τm is not credible.28 If large countries are suﬃciently patient, that is if the
incentive constraints for the MTL do not bind, then we can focus on the following FOC to determine
28B e l o ww es h o ww h e nt h i sc o n s t r a i n ti si t s e l fs e l f - e n f o r c i n gs ot h a tl a r g ec o u n t r i e sr e s p e c ti t .














In the second condition the ﬁrst two terms are standard and if they were the only ones then free
trade would be the outcome. The last term, WL
τL, is the standard MFN externality and arises because
large countries ignore the small countries’ welfare when choosing the multilateral tariﬀ. When Large
imports the same good from Large* and Small an increase in the multilateral tariﬀ also increases
the tariﬀ on Small’s exports thus allowing Large to capture extra tariﬀ revenue. This eﬀect explains
the initial increase in Large’s welfare under commitment when we graph it against the cooperative
multilateral tariﬀ, as shown by the curve WCL in ﬁgure 6.29 In the ﬁrst condition, instead of WL
τL,
we have two terms representing the eﬀect of raising the multilateral tariﬀ o nt h et h r e a tt a r i ﬀ and
consequently on the LSPTA preferential tariﬀ and e-tax. If this eﬀe c tv i at h et h r e a tt a r i ﬀ exceeds the
tariﬀ revenue eﬀect under commitment then the tariﬀ under the exception is higher than predicted
by the standard MFN externality.
We can state the main proposition of this section using the following deﬁnition. A LSPTA
exception to MFN is a stumbling (building) bloc to multilateral trade liberalization (MTL) if the
multilateral tariﬀ under this exception is higher (lower) than the tariﬀ under a regime where no such
exceptions are allowed, i.e. τEXm > τCm (τEXm < τCm).
Proposition 3 ( L S P T A sa ss t u m b l i n gb l o c s ,τEXm > τCm, patient large countries):
When large countries are suﬃciently patient an LSPTA exception to MFN is a stumbling bloc to MTL
if and only if the LSPTA is duty-free.
The intuition is as follows. An MFN reduction lowers the threat that Large can use in the
LSPTA. Therefore Small’s gain from cooperating in the LSPTA falls because it has less to loose from
not cooperating. Since Small’s gain from deviating remains unchanged the self-enforcing value of eS
falls for any given preferential tariﬀ.I nﬁgure 5 this corresponds to a downward shift of Small’s IC
by the amount of the reduction in the multilateral tariﬀ. To ensure that Small’s IC holds Large
must either lower the preferential tariﬀ by the same amount as the reduction in the multilateral tariﬀ
or accept a lower eS.S i n c e WL is linear in τL Large would prefer to lower τL by the amount of
29The standard MFN externality is well known, see for example Horn and Mavroidis (2000) and references therein.
17the reduction in τm. If after such a reduction τL is non-negative then the MFN reduction has the
same welfare eﬀect under commitment and the LSPTA exception: to reduce τL b yt h ea m o u n to ft h e
reduction in τm. Thus there is no motive for higher multilateral tariﬀs under the LSPTA exception.
However, if lowering τL by the amount of the MFN reduction would entail a negative tariﬀ then
Large is forced to accept a lower eS. This is more costly then the loss in tariﬀ revenue from Small’s
exports that occurs under commitment, which explains why multilateral tariﬀs are then higher under
the LSPTA exception. So the tariﬀ under the exception reﬂects the standard MFN externality, as
does the tariﬀ under commitment, and the additional eﬀect which we refer to as the stumbling bloc
eﬀect.
Given that a number of LSPTAs are duty-free, e.g. the US GSP program, the eﬀect we analyze is
likely to be present. Interestingly if the current WTO requirement that PTAs eliminate all internal
barriers were strictly enforced only duty-free LSPTAs would exist and these are precisely the ones
that have a negative impact on multilateral trade liberalization. Below we determine when this eﬀect
is quantitatively signiﬁcant and its welfare eﬀects on the modelled countries.
A standard commonly applied to the desirability of preferential agreements is their eﬀect on non-
members. It is immediately clear that if we introduce countries, similar to Small but with nothing
to oﬀer to Large in an LSPTA, those countries would be harmed by the higher multilateral tariﬀs
on their exports under the LSPTA exception. This provides one motivation to analyze which rules
or type of agreements remove this stumbling bloc to MTL (below we show that it is not the only
motivation). First, we note two basic institutional changes which are not suﬃcient to remove the
stumbling bloc. Second, we show that the commitment alternative analyzed above may be diﬃcult
to enforce in the context of the WTO if large countries are not suﬃciently patient.
We have considered the current set of WTO rules that require the maximum tariﬀ to be bound by
the multilateral tariﬀ, however this is not a necessary condition for the stumbling bloc eﬀect. If Large
could threaten Small with the Nash tariﬀ, τNL, then a reduction in the multilateral tariﬀ would still
lower the LSPTA threat point. Recall that τNL equals pL(τm), which falls if the multilateral tariﬀ
is reduced. Thus even if Large can threaten Small with τNL the stumbling eﬀect may be present
depending on how much market power in trade Large has.30
Participation of the two small LSPTA partners in the multilateral negotiation is also insuﬃcient
to remove the stumbling bloc. If all countries have the same weight during this negotiation then






δS , independently of whether
the LSPTA is duty-free. This condition is less likely to hold if Large has signiﬁcant market power in trade since then
pτm approaches zero.
18free trade is optimal under commitment. At free trade a marginal increase in the multilateral tariﬀ
has no direct ﬁrst-order eﬀect on the joint welfare of the four countries but it allows large countries
to exchange preferential access for public good provision. Thus a positive multilateral tariﬀ would
increase the joint welfare of these four countries but would continue to harm any excluded parties.
4.3 Enforcing commitment to alternative MFN regimes
The failure of the two simple alternatives above to eliminate the stumbling eﬀect suggests that it is
likely to hold in more general settings. If that is the case then according to proposition 3 implementing
the commitment regime would certainly solve the problem when the large countries are suﬃciently
patient. But we now show that if they are not suﬃciently patient, i.e. if the IC for the MTL do
bind, then it is crucial to analyze how governments enforce not just the tariﬀsw i t h i nag i v e nr e g i m e
but the regime itself. Importantly we show that simply removing WTO articles which allow for an
LSPTA exception may actually lead to higher multilateral tariﬀs.
To analyze the case when the IC bind we must specify the trigger strategies, which depend on
whether governments choose the LSPTA exception or commitment to MFN. To commit to MFN
countries must remove the WTO rules that allow exceptions: article XXIV and/or the parts of the
Enabling clause. To enforce the multilateral tariﬀ and non-discrimination large countries can threaten
each other to revert to Nash in that tariﬀ. But if countries ever do revert to Nash there may be nothing
else they can threaten to enforce non-discrimination. To analyze this point we distinguish between
weak and strong commitment to MFN. Weak commitment represents one extreme case when there
is no other threat available to enforce non-discrimination during trade wars between large countries.
Strong commitment represents the other extreme when countries are assumed to have the instruments
to enforce non-discrimination during trade wars. The three diﬀerent regimes, LSPTA exception, weak
and strong commitment to MFN, lead to diﬀerent incentive constraints and therefore diﬀerent levels
of multilateral trade liberalization.
Under the LSPTA exception cooperation in multilateral tariﬀs is conditional on past cooperation
by the large countries in those tariﬀs, i.e. τm = τm∗
= τc, and at a r i ﬀ against the Small partner no
higher than the multilateral value. Thus the highest credible threat Large can make to Small without
incurring punishment from Large* is τc. But, when there is no cooperation in multilateral tariﬀs,
governments are free to set discriminatory tariﬀs. Large then sets the multilateral tariﬀ at the Nash
level, τNm (deﬁned below in lemma 1), and threatens Small with τNL = pL(τNm). So, under this
19regime, the incentive constraint in eq.(13), ICEX,i sΩEX ≤ δL
1−δLωEX,w h e r e :
ωEX ≡ WL(τB(τc),e B(τc),τc,τm∗
= τc,.) − WL(τB(τNL),e B(τNL),τNm,τNm∗
,.) (17)
ΩEX ≡ WL(τB(τNL),e B(τNL),τNm,τm∗
= τc,.) − WL(τB(τc),e B(τc),τc,τm∗
= τc,.) (18)
Under weak commitment to MFN if either large country deviates in the multilateral tariﬀ or
sets a discriminatory tariﬀ on the small partner then both large countries revert to Nash behavior
in multilateral tariﬀs, τNm. But, when there is no cooperation in multilateral tariﬀs, governments
are free to set discriminatory tariﬀs since they then have no way to enforce non-discrimination. This
implies that if Large countries were to ever stop cooperating in MFN tariﬀs they would sign LSPTAs
and use τNL, the same threat as under the LSPTA when there is no cooperation. As the payoﬀs
below show this means that weak commitment is exactly identical to the LSPTA exception during
periods of deviation or punishment. So, under weak commitment, the gains from cooperation and
deviation are respectively:
ωWC ≡ WL(τL = τc,e S =0 ,τc,τm∗
= τc,.) − WL(τB(τNL),e B(τNL),τNm,τNm∗
,.)
ΩWC ≡ WL(τB(τNL),e B(τNL),τNm,τm∗
= τc,.) − WL(τL = τc,e S =0 ,τc,τm∗
= τc,.)
Under strong commitment to MFN governments set a non-discriminatory tariﬀ at all times
and therefore cannot pursue LSPTAs. For this commitment to be credible in the current model,
where governments always have access to discriminatory tariﬀs, we would require a trigger strategy
similar to the one under weak commitment plus an extra instrument for governments to punish each
other when they are oﬀ the equilibrium path in their MFN tariﬀs. Such an instrument would ensure
that governments would not ﬁnd it optimal to use discriminatory tariﬀs and sign an LSPTA, even
after deviating from the MTL agreement. One way to achieve this is to replace inﬁnite Nash reversion
with temporary punishments. We can then have a longer punishment period when countries deviate
from the multilateral tariﬀ and form LSPTAs then when they deviate but do not form LSPTAs. We
do not model alternative strategies here but assume them implicitly so that governments do not use
discriminatory tariﬀs and set a single tariﬀ on both partners. The trigger strategy in this modiﬁed
model is to set the non-discriminatory tariﬀ at the cooperative level if that was the history of play in
previous periods for both large countries and otherwise revert to the Nash value, τN,d e ﬁned below
20in lemma 1. Under strong commitment the gains from cooperation and deviation are:
ωSC ≡ WL(τL = τc,e B =0 ,τc,τm∗
= τc,.) − WL(τL = τN,e B =0 ,τN,τN∗
,.)
ΩSC ≡ WL(τL = τN,e B =0 ,τN,τm∗
= τc,.) − WL(τL = τc,e B =0 ,τc,τm∗
= τc,.)
4.4 LSPTAs as building or stumbling blocs (impatient large countries)
We can now determine if the LSPTA exception is a stumbling bloc or a building bloc to MTL when
Large countries are not suﬃciently patient. To do so we compare the most-cooperative tariﬀ, τR,
that is the lowest tariﬀ that is self-enforcing under each of the regimes R = EX,WC,SC:31
ΩR(τR,.)=
δL
1 − δLωR(τR,.) (19)
Focusing on the most-cooperative tariﬀ is only meaningful if the constraints bind at the optimal
solutions. As will be clear, for our comparison it is suﬃcient to ensure that the LSPTA constraint
binds because τEXm ≥ τCm, as we show in proposition 3. For the constraint under the exception to
bind we require δL < δEX,w h e r eδEX is implicitly deﬁned by ΩEX(τR = τEXm,.)= δEX
1−δEXωR(τR =
τEXm,.).W eﬁrst compare the LSPTA and weak commitment regimes.
Proposition 4 (LSPTA exception vs. weak commitment, τEX < τWC)
AL S P T Ae x c e p t i o nt oM F Ni sab u i l d i n gb l o ct oM T Lr e l a t i v et oaw e a kc o m m i t m e n tt oM F Ni f
δL < δEX .
When δL < δEX the multilateral tariﬀ under the LSPTA is determined by the most-cooperative
tariﬀ. We show that this tariﬀ is lower under the LSPTA than weak commitment regime by evaluating
the gain from deviation and cooperation under weak commitment at τEX.W eﬁnd that both the gain
from deviation is higher and the gain from cooperation lower than under the exception. Intuitively,
deviating in multilateral tariﬀs under the exception allows large countries to extract more cooperation
from the LSPTA by using a bigger threat, τNL instead of τc. However, deviating under weak
commitment leads to an even larger gain because initially there was no LSPTA at all and after
31If Ω
R and ω
R are respectively convex and concave with respect to the cooperative MFN tariﬀ then there is only
one tariﬀ lower than the Nash that satisﬁes eq.(19). It is simple to show that these conditions hold for all three regimes
when excess demands are linear in prices. For the convexity of Ω
SC and Ω
WC we use the fact that pτ < 1.F o r t h e
concavity of ω








l and in addition, for the LSPTA exception
case, that Ψ is concave.
21deviating Large uses τNL as a threat. Similarly the gains from cooperation for Large are lower under
weak commitment because it foregoes the LSPTA.
Enforcement considerations completely reverse the stumbling bloc result of proposition 3 in the
case of weak commitment. Consider now the case of strong commitment. Because the behavior for
the exception and weak commitment regimes are equal under deviation and punishment periods the
value of each policy, e.g. τNm, is also equal across the two regimes in those situations. However, under
strong commitment the Nash non-discriminatory tariﬀ, τN,i sd i ﬀerent from the Nash multilateral
tariﬀ, τNm, and we must know their relative values to compare payoﬀs during trade wars. The








Lemma 1: τN ≥ τNm if Large has suﬃcient market power.
To understand this lemma consider a case where Large has suﬃcient market power. Namely,
assume that the LSPTA has the interior solution BI in ﬁgure 5a (note that this is still compatible
with a duty-free LSPTA at a threat lower than τNL = pL(τNm)). In this case Large’s iso-welfare
and Small’s incentive frontier are tangent so WL
eS/WL
τL = k/δS and thus Large has suﬃcient market
power because pτ is less than one. Under commitment a marginal increase in the MFN tariﬀ increases
Large’s welfare by the amount of its imports from Small, H/k. A similar increase under the LSPTA
increases the threat tariﬀ by pτ, since the threat is τNL during a trade war and τNL = p(τm).I ft h e
solution is at BI then the preferential tariﬀ also rises by pτ. This increases Large’s welfare but only
by pτ times H/k, moreover, the higher Large’s market power the lower pτ is. There is then clearly a
motive to increase τN above τNm. When the LSPTA solution is not τBI we must take into account
the extra beneﬁt of higher threat tariﬀs from exchanging the tariﬀ revenue into higher eS.
This is important because when τN ≥ τNm Large also faces τN∗
≥ τNm∗
which is suﬃcient to
ensure lower welfare during a trade war under commitment. The possibility of a costlier trade war
due to higher multilateral tariﬀs will then be one of the factors that sustains better cooperation in
the multilateral tariﬀ under commitment relative to the exception.
Proposition 5 (LSPTA exception vs. strong commitment, τEX > τSC)
A LSPTA exception to MFN is a stumbling bloc to MTL relative to a strong commitment to MFN if
δL < δEX and large countries have suﬃcient market power.
22When δL < δEX the multilateral tariﬀ under the exception regime is determined by the most-
cooperative tariﬀ, this proposition provides a suﬃcient condition such that this tariﬀ is higher than
under strong commitment. Similarly to proposition 4 we evaluate the gains from cooperation and
deviation for strong commitment at τEX. Relative to strong commitment the exception has a larger
gain from deviating and a lower gain from cooperating in the MTL because of the gain from setting
a discriminatory tariﬀ on Small.
First, if the LSPTA is not duty-free during periods of cooperation between large countries (and
therefore during trade wars) then the cost of lowering the multilateral tariﬀ is identical under the
exception and strong commitment regime, it is simply the lost tariﬀ revenue on Small’s imports
(proposition 3). However, the stumbling bloc result still holds because the possibility of using dis-
criminatory tariﬀs under the exception regime lowers the cost of trade wars between large countries
if they have suﬃc i e n tm a r k e tp o w e r ,i . e . i fτN ≥ τNm. This ability to discriminate means that
large countries need not maintain their multilateral tariﬀs as high to extract revenue from Small.
Thus with the exception regime they can enjoy at least as high export prices as they would in a
trade war under strong commitment and receive extra revenue from Small (since τNL exceeds τNm).
Second, there is an extra eﬀect if the LSPTA is duty-free during trade wars between large countries
(and therefore during periods of cooperation): a reduction of the multilateral tariﬀ is relatively more
costly under the LSPTA . This is the eﬀect we discuss in proposition 3.32
The last two propositions show that if large countries are not suﬃciently patient they must
be extremely careful when deciding whether to enforce a regime of commitment to MFN. If they
can credibly sustain a strong commitment then lower multilateral tariﬀs can be sustainable, a weak
commitment to MFN however will lead to even higher multilateral tariﬀs than those under the LSPTA
exceptions currently allowed in the WTO.
Our results answer an important positive question: the qualitative eﬀect on multilateral tariﬀs
of alternative WTO rules. However, we also want to quantify these eﬀects and derive more speciﬁc
welfare implications for the countries modelled. In particular we answer the following. What is
the eﬀect of “deepening” regional integration on multilateral tariﬀ cooperation and welfare? Are our
results valid if the public good has global spillovers? Which regime is preferred by large and small
countries?
32In proposition 5 we establish when τ
EX > τ
SC. Clearly if at δ
L < δ
EX we have τ
SC < τ
Cm,t h e nτ
Cm is chosen as
the strong commitment solution since it is the unconstrained optimum. This would not change the point of proposition
5s i n c eτ
Cm ≤ τ
EXm < τ




WC),w h e r eδ
SC and δ
WC are deﬁned similarly to δ
EX. Therefore propositions 3,4 and 5 are




EX. Otherwise there is an extra case to analyze when δ ∈ [δ
EX,δ
LC).
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5.1 Deepening LSPTAs and MTL
We now show that the stumbling eﬀect is increasing in the weight placed on the public good, λL,
and its cross-border eﬀect, αL. Moreover, such increases, which are one factor driving the observed
“deepening” of LSPTAs, have an ambiguous eﬀect on the welfare of the small members. For a given
tariﬀ threat in the LSPTA, an increase in either αL or λL “deepens” it, that is it lowers Large’s
optimal preferential tariﬀ and increases the optimal level of the public good provided by Small.
Deepening the LSPTA requires a higher threat tariﬀ and therefore a higher multilateral tariﬀ under
the following conditions.
Proposition 6 (Eﬀect of deepening LSPTA on multilateral tariﬀs)
Increases in αL or λL increase the multilateral tariﬀ and the stumbling bloc eﬀect if and only if the
LSPTA is duty-free.
Increases in αL or λL imply a higher marginal beneﬁt for Large from increases in the e-tax, so
in addition to increasing its own e-tax, Large ﬁnds it optimal to oﬀer a lower preferential tariﬀ in
exchange for more public good from Small. However, this is only feasible if the preferential tariﬀ is
not negative. After a duty-free LSPTA is reached Small has no further incentive to increase eS and
Large must then use a higher threat tariﬀ. This higher threat is only credible if it does not exceed
the multilateral tariﬀ, otherwise it triggers retaliation from Large*, and therefore the equilibrium
multilateral tariﬀ must increase. Alternatively, if the LSPTA is not duty-free there is no reason for
Large to distort the multilateral tariﬀ, it can simply lower the preferential tariﬀ. The stumbling
bloc eﬀect increases because under strong commitment the multilateral tariﬀ is independent of the
importance of the public good.33
The last proposition is particularly important since both αL and λL appear to be increasing.34
Therefore, a testable prediction from this model is that, ceteris paribus, increases in αL and λL lead
33Bond, Syropoulos and Winters (2001) analyze the eﬀect of a reduction in a customs union’s internal tariﬀ on its
external one. They show that, for elasticities of consumption no greater than one, if the exogenous reduction of the
internal tariﬀ (which is assumed to be binding) is accompanied by a suﬃciently large external tariﬀ reduction (which
must be self-enforcing) then the initial tariﬀ set by the rest of the world on the customs union remains self-enforcing.
So deepening can lead to lower multilateral tariﬀs. Theirs is a pure trade model and the results are driven by trade
diversion. The fact that the prediction is the opposite of theo n ei no u rp a p e rc l e a r l ys h o w st h ei m p o r t a n c eo fm o d e l l i n g
LSPTAs.
34One reason for this is the increased scientiﬁc knowledge regarding the interdependence of ecosystems, which has
made it clear that a number of environmental problems have a wider regional or even global impact. The increase in
λ
L is likely to be a consequence of development as long as the public good is normal in consumption.
24to higher multilateral tariﬀs in the goods imported from a regional partner after a duty-free LSPTA
is formed. Alternatively, if we modelled an exogenous process of gradual MTL, the prediction would
be a slower reduction of multilateral tariﬀs in those goods. We now show this can have a negative
eﬀect on the welfare of the small LSPTA partners when Small countries are suﬃciently patient,
i.e. when δS >p τ.
Proposition 7 (Eﬀect of deepening LSPTA on Small’s welfare)
Increases in αL or λL are welfare improving for Small if the LSPTA is not duty-free. Otherwise
increases in αL or λL are welfare improving for Small if and only if it is not suﬃciently patient.
To understand this result we ﬁr s tn o t et h a ti n c r e a s e si nαL or λL aﬀect Small only via changes
in τB or eB and recall that LSPTAs are welfare improving for Small at a given tariﬀ threat. Thus,
if the increase in αL or λL simply result in a lower preferential tariﬀ then Small is left better oﬀ.
However, if the LSPTA is duty-free the threat tariﬀ is increased thus forcing Small to increase eS by
δs/k. In exchange Small receives a higher price for its exports, by pL
τ , and so it is better oﬀ if and
only if the aggregate marginal beneﬁt of the increase in the multilateral tariﬀs, pL
τ H/k, exceeds the
cost, δSH/k. This occurs if Small is not suﬃc i e n t l yp a t i e n ts i n c ei ti st h e nt h a ti tc a ne x t r a c tt h e
most from the LSPTA.
Finally, note that a large enough increase in αL or λL leads to a duty-free LSPTA and consequently
an increase in the threat tariﬀ. If that increase is suﬃciently large and Small is suﬃciently patient
then it will be left worse oﬀ. Below we determine Small’s preferred regime and provide the exact
conditions under which that loss from a higher multilateral tariﬀ oﬀsets the initial gains to Small
from lower preferential tariﬀs.
5.2 Global spillovers
The previous results show that multilateral trade rules must take into account preferential trade agree-
m e n t se v e ni ft h e yh a v en ot r a d ed i v e r s i o no rc r e a t i o ne ﬀects and deal only with regional spillovers.
Although the spillovers for some public goods are mainly regional, many have global spillovers, e.g.
global warming or “psychological” costs due to “poor” enforcement of human or core workers’ rights.
To evaluate the eﬀect of dealing with such issues “outside” the WTO we show that the results thus
far are also valid if the spillovers are global.
25Small countries do not value the public good and therefore their welfare functions are unchanged.
The original function for Large, WL, must be generalized to reﬂect the public good spillovers from
the other trade bloc.





Given the separability of ˆ WL the non-cooperative tariﬀ τNL remains pL. The self-enforcing
solution to the LSPTA for a given tariﬀ threat is also unchanged since it takes the other bloc’s
actions as given. Moreover, a large country cannot oﬀer tariﬀ reductions and form an LSPTA with
the small country in the opposite bloc since they do not trade with each other. Therefore the results
in section 3 continue to hold in the presence of global spillovers.35
We are interested in the impact of LSPTAs on multilateral tariﬀs when linking multilateral tariﬀ
cooperation and non-trade policies during MTL is not allowed in the WTO, i.e. countries deal with
these non-trade issues “outside” the WTO. Therefore, the trigger strategies that enforce cooperation
in multilateral tariﬀs must be independent of whether large countries cooperate with each other in
the provision of the public good. Moreover, since the externality enters additively in welfare, the
equilibrium level of the multilateral tariﬀs will also be independent of whether large countries enter
into a separate self-enforcing agreement with each other to address the non-trade issue.36
From this it should be immediately obvious that the stumbling bloc result in proposition 3 is
qualitatively unchanged. In fact when the stumbling eﬀect is present it is now stronger. When
spillovers are regional Large has nothing to gain from an increase in the multilateral tariﬀ of Large*.
In contrast, under global spillovers, this increase leads to more cooperation from Small* which also
beneﬁts Large.
To conﬁrm the results in propositions 4 and 5, we need only verify how the IC must be modiﬁed
because the trigger strategies during the MTL stage are unchanged. Starting with the LSPTA regime,
the gains from cooperation expression under regional spillovers, ωEX, is augmented:
ˆ ωEX ≡ ωEX + Hα∗λL(Ψ(bS∗
HeB(τc)) − Ψ(bS∗
HeB(τNL)))
There is an extra cost to multilateral tariﬀ cooperation if spillovers are global. This cost corresponds
to the foregone public good supply by the small country in the opposite bloc due to the lower tariﬀ
35Here our assumption of prohibitive trade costs across regional blocs is clearly important.
36It is simple to model such a self-enforcing agreement with trigger strategies that resort only to changes in the
non-trade policy. See for example Barret (1994) and Limão (2002).
26threat that Large* imposes after MTL. The gains from deviation are unchanged. Therefore we
conclude that the most-cooperative tariﬀ under the LSPTA exception is higher when the spillovers
are global if the LSPTA is duty-free since otherwise there is simply a reduction in the preferential
tariﬀ but no change in e.
Under weak commitment the gains from cooperation also reﬂect an extra cost:
ˆ ωWC ≡ ωWC − Hα∗λLΨ(bS∗
HeB(τNL))
Notice that this extra cost is larger than under the exception and is present independently of whether
the LSPTA is duty-free. Moreover, the gains from deviation remain unchanged and therefore the
building bloc result from proposition 4 continues to hold and is now more pronounced.
Finally, under strong commitment, it is simple to show that the most-cooperative tariﬀ is un-
changed since no LSPTAs ever take place. This implies that the stumbling bloc eﬀect is still present,
under the conditions in proposition 5, and is possibly stronger when spillovers are global.
In sum, allowing the public good to have a global spillover does not change our previous results
qualitatively. In fact it can reinforce the results in propositions 3, 4 and 5. We now return to the
original setup with regional spillovers to show which regime is preferred by the diﬀerent countries.
5.3 Welfare eﬀects and the choice of MFN regime
A common complaint from developing countries is that most GATT/WTO rules are decided by
developed countries.37 To capture this we assume that, in addition to choosing the multilateral
tariﬀ level, large countries also choose the trading rules to maximize the present discounted value
of their own joint welfare. Therefore we rank the payoﬀs for the large countries under the LSPTA
and commitment regimes to show which they chose. We then contrast this to the small countries’
preferred regime.
Proposition 8 (Welfare ranking of regimes for Large)
The LSPTA exception regime welfare dominates commitment to MFN for large countries if they are
suﬃciently patient.
We illustrate the result in ﬁgure 6, which depicts Large’s welfare function during cooperation
periods under the exception, WEXL, and commitment, WCL. For a given positive multilateral tariﬀ
37See for example Srinivasan (1999).
27the welfare function under commitment never lies above the exception because LSPTAs are welfare
improving, strictly so if δS > 0. Therefore, when the IC for the MTL do not bind, Large prefers
the exception regime since it can always set the multilateral tariﬀ at the commitment level and then
improve its welfare by signing an LSPTA.
If the large countries are not suﬃciently patient, so that the IC for the MTL do bind, then
the LSPTA exception also welfare dominates weak commitment. This is simply because in periods
of cooperation under weak commitment no LSPTAs take place and moreover any tariﬀ that is self-
enforcing under weak commitment is also self-enforcing under the exception as we show in proposition
4.
Finally, it is possible to show that Large prefers strong commitment if Small is very impatient.
This can occur when the self-enforcing tariﬀ under the exception exceeds that under strong com-
mitment (proposition 5). Brieﬂy, consider the case when Small is extremely impatient (δS =0 )s o
that the only self-enforcing policies under an LSPTA are to set τB at τm and therefore Small sets
the e-tax at zero. This implies that WEXL(δS =0 ) coincides with WCL, as shown in ﬁgure 6. In
this case the lowest self-enforcing tariﬀ under the exception is higher than τCm and Large is strictly
better oﬀ under strong commitment as illustrated. We can then show that this is also true for strictly
positive values of δS. Figure 6 illustrates a point at which the welfare under strong commitment and
the exception are again equalized, EX(δS > 0).38
Having determined the regime preferred and therefore chosen by the large countries we now
show that it is not always the one preferred by the small countries. We compare the LSPTA and
commitment regimes when Large is suﬃciently patient.
Proposition 9 (Welfare ranking of regimes for Small)
When Small is not suﬃciently patient it prefers the LSPTA regime.
When Small is suﬃciently patient:
(i) it prefers the LSPTA regime if the LSPTA under τEXm(δS) is not duty-free.
(ii) there exists a δS ∈ (pτ,1) s.t. Small prefers the commitment regime if the LSPTA under τEXm(δS)
is duty-free.
We illustrate this result in ﬁgure 7, which graphs Small’s welfare as a function of the multilateral
tariﬀ for diﬀerent discount factors. When the LSPTA is not duty-free then the multilateral is the
38See Limão (2001) for more details.
28same under the commitment and exception regimes. Moreover, since at a given multilateral tariﬀ,
Small is better oﬀ under the LSPTA, it prefers this regime, point EX1, relative to commitment, C.I f
the LSPTA is duty-free then the multilateral tariﬀ is higher under the exception regime and we must
consider this extra eﬀect on Small’s welfare. As described in proposition 7 if Small is not suﬃciently
patient then the increase in pL caused by the higher tariﬀ leaves Small better oﬀ. So clearly in this
case it also prefers the LSPTA because it leaves it at a point along the upward sloping line in ﬁgure
7, all of which dominate C. However, if Small is suﬃciently patient then increases in the multilateral
tariﬀ l e a v ei tw o r s eo ﬀ. Consider the case when Small is extremely patient, so that its welfare is along
WEXS(δS =1 )and the LSPTA is duty-free so that τEXm > τCm, then Small is strictly worse oﬀ
under the LSPTA. It is then clear that, if the LSPTA is duty-free, a discount factor smaller than one
exists such that the negative eﬀect of the higher multilateral tariﬀ oﬀsets any gains from the LSPTA,
as seen by comparing Small’s welfare at point EX0 and C.
The LSPTA exception can hurt small countries which are not LSPTA members because it creates
an incentive for Large countries to maintain higher multilateral tariﬀs. The last proposition shows
that some small countries which are part of duty-free LSPTAs also prefer commitment to MFN if
they are suﬃciently patient. Thus, even if preferential agreements have no trade diversion or creation
eﬀects the choice of WTO rules that regulates them has important consequences not only for the
level of the multilateral tariﬀs but also for the welfare of small countries.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Trade is not the only and often not even the main motivation for preferential trade agreements.
Thus far we have neglected to model these other motives and the eﬀects of such agreements on the
multilateral trading system. But we clearly cannot continue to do so because the non-trade objectives
in preferential agreements are now both pervasive and quite explicit.
We take these non-trade issues seriously and show that, even in the absence of trade creation
or diversion eﬀects, preferential trade agreements have important eﬀects on the multilateral trading
system. We model the non-trade issue as the provision of a public good, which plausibly covers a
number of issues. More importantly, the basic intuition for our stumbling bloc result is likely to
hold for diﬀerent representations of non-trade issues that are valued by large countries. Lowering
multilateral tariﬀs reduces the preferential margins that can be negotiated by any two WTO members.
If these preferences have value, for example because they enforce cooperation on a non-trade issue,
there is an extra cost to reducing multilateral tariﬀs relative to the case when there is no possibility
29for a preferential agreement.
How important is this stumbling eﬀect? This is a diﬃcult question which must be settled empiri-
cally, however we argue that the eﬀect is potentially important for two reasons. First, despite the low
average multilateral tariﬀs in the US and the EU there are sectors, such as agriculture and textiles
where those tariﬀs remain high. These are some of the sectors in which developing countries export
to the US and EU and therefore precisely the sectors in which our model predicts higher tariﬀs.
Moreover, multilateral tariﬀ reductions have often been oﬀset by increases in non-tariﬀ measures so
tariﬀs understate the degree of eﬀective protection. A clear example of this is the increase in the use
of anti-dumping and associated countervailing duties in the US. Clearly our model would have to be
modiﬁed to deal with non-tariﬀ barriers, which become the relevant threat point when multilateral
tariﬀs are low. However, it is likely that the basic intuition for our result would again hold if these
non-trade barriers became the subject of negotiation in the WTO. In that case, the US opposition to
discuss proposals for stricter anti-dumping rules in the 1999 Seattle ministerial meeting of the WTO
is consistent with the stumbling bloc prediction.
Second, not only is there an eﬀect to be explained, the high trade barriers described above, but
we also believe that our explanation may have an advantage over a common alternative explanation.
According to the standard MFN externality explanation large countries have less of an incentive to
lower tariﬀs if they must do so on all partners and they do not receive a reciprocal tariﬀ reduction
from some of those partners, in this case the small countries. However, if the exports from small
countries are jointly small then the MFN externality cannot fully account for the magnitude of those
barriers. On the other hand the stumbling bloc eﬀect we analyze may be important even for small
levels of exports if large countries highly value the public good.
The stumbling bloc eﬀect has a negative eﬀect on small countries that are not members of any
LSPTA and export the set of goods in which the multilateral tariﬀ is higher. This provides a strong
motivation for the WTO to regulate LSPTAs more carefully. However, governments must take great
care to ensure they can enforce an alternative rules regime. As we show, simply eliminating the
current rules that allow exceptions to MFN may actually lead to higher multilateral tariﬀs. But,
with additional rules that credibly sustain a strong commitment to MFN governments can enforce
lower multilateral tariﬀs.
Finally, the model predicts that large countries choose the LSPTA exception regime over com-
mitment to MFN when they are suﬃciently patient. Similarly they chose the exception regime over
weak commitment if they are not suﬃciently patient. Both of these predictions are reassuring since
30the exception regime is indeed the status quo. More importantly however, small countries do not
always prefer the exception regime. When the exception regime entails higher multilateral tariﬀs
than a commitment regime and small countries do not gain much from the LSPTA they prefer the
commitment regime. This shows the potential gain for small countries of actively participating in
setting multilateral trade rules in future trade rounds.
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Timing of governments' actions in each period of the repeated game 
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 Large countries first choose a regime (R), which specifies their commitment to MFN. We consider commitment to MFN 
(no preferential tariffs allowed) or an LSPTA exception (lower than MFN tariffs allowed). When large countries are not 
sufficiently patient we distinguish further between strong and weak commitment to MFN (SC and WC) depending on 
whether countries can enforce MFN during trade wars between themselves (SC) or not (WC). Given the regime large 
countries choose a level for the MFN tariff (τ
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Pattern of Trade 
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The arrows represent the direction of exports of the non-numeraire goods.  We assume that trading costs (due to transport or 
information for example) are prohibitively high between small and large countries in opposite blocks. The balance of 
payments condition is satisfied via the numeraire good. Figure 3 
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Point N denotes the non-cooperative solution to Large's tariff on Small and the latter's e-tax, (τ
NL=p
L, e
S=0).  The shaded 
area represents potential LSPTAs which are Pareto improving. The slope of Small's iso-welfare line is -k<-1, the ratio of 




L represents LSPTAs that are both Pareto improving and Pareto efficient. Any efficient bargaining 
solution must lie on T
STT
L. If Large (Small) has all the bargaining power and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer then the 
solution is at T
L (T
S). The segment TT
L  is vertical because changes in Large's tariff on Small have only tariff revenue 
effects, which are constant and thus have no impact on the slope of the iso-welfare curves. 
 Figure 4 
Pareto efficient TOL LSPTAs (0T
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If the threat tariff is τ
NL then the TOL LSPTA solution is at T
L, as in figure 3. For threat tariffs no higher than τ
T ' the TOL 




L'  is vertical because changes in Large's tariff on Small have only tariff effects, which are constant and 
thus have no impact on the slope of the iso-welfare curves.  Figure 5 Self-enforcing Pareto efficient LSPTA solutions 
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5b. Duty-free LSPTA: Large sufficiently endowed relative to Small (B) 
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The shaded area represents the set of self-enforcing LSPTAs that improve on the Nash; it is delimited by each country's 
incentive frontiers. BI represents the self-enforcing TOL LSPTA solution proposed by Large when it is not sufficiently 
endowed relative to Small, i.e. when k is not sufficiently high. Under this condition an alternative solution occurs if Large's 
IC binds  and would lie at the intersection of Large and Small's incentive frontiers (BII not depicted). In 5b point B 
represents the self-enforcing TOL LSPTA solution proposed by Large when it is sufficiently endowed relative to Small, i.e. 
when k is sufficiently high.  Figure 6  
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S=0 the welfare functions for Large under commitment and the LSPTA exception are identical and the exception 
solution is at EX (δ
S=0). The welfare function under the exception is also illustrated for a critical value of δ
S at which the 
maximized value under strong commitment and the exception are equalized. 
Figure 7 
Optimal MFN regime for small countries 
    τ








 RS W 
EXS(δ
S ∈ (0, pτ ))
W 
EXS(δ
S = pτ )
W 
EXS(δ


















Small's welfare is linear in the MFN tariff. If δ
S ∈ (pτ ,1] then increases in the MFN tariff leave Small worse off.  When δ
S=1 
W 
EXS and W 
CS coincide. The equilibrium under commitment is at C, under the exception it is at τ
EX ≥  τ
C. If the LSPTA is 
duty-free then τ
EXm > τ
Cm and a δ
S ∈ (pτ ,1) exists such that Small is worse off under the exception, e.g. point EX0. References
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A.1 Proofs
Proposition 1: (τB(τT),e B(τT))




















Using equations 5,6,11 and 12 our conditions reduce to αLλLδSHbSΨ0(bSHeS)|eS=τTδS/k1 =1for k1
and αLλLδLΨ(bSHeS)|eS=τTδS/k2 = τT/k2 for k2.
Forming the Lagrangian with µj and φg as the multipliers for the incentive and non-negativity
constraints respectively we have the following necessary conditions for j = L, S and g = τL,e S:
∂WL/∂g − Σjµj(∂Ωj/∂g −
δj
1 − δj∂ωj/∂g)+ φg =0
µj(Ωj −
δj
1 − δjωj)=0 ;φgg =0 ;µj, φg ≥ 0
First, if ΩS < δS
1−δSωS a tt h es o l u t i o nt h e na ni n c r e a s ei neS is feasible and optimal which implies
that ΩS = δS
1−δSωS ⇔ eB = δS
k (τT − τB),u s i n gt h ed e ﬁnitions in eqs.(5, 9, 10).
If k = k2 then, by deﬁnition, ΩL = δL
1−δLωL at τB =0 ,e B = δSτT
k ,t h u si nﬁgure 5 IC
L and IC
S
intersect at τL =0 .A ni n c r e a s ei nk relaxes ICL at any given τT since it reduces ΩL = H
k (τT−τL) and
increases ωL = δ
1−δ(−H
k (τT − τL)+HαLλLΨ(bSHeS)).T h u sΩL ≤ δL
1−δLωL at τB =0 ,e B = δSτT
k




τLδS.N o w , i f k>k 2 then ICL does not














τLδS at (τB =0 ,e B = δSτT/k). Thus, since we rule out τB < 0 it must be





When k<k 2 then, by deﬁnition, IC
L and IC
S intersect at τL > 0 and two cases arise. First, if ΩL <
δL




τLδS and τB by eB = δS
k (τT −τB).
Second, if ΩL = δL
1−δLωL then τT − τB = δLkαLλLΨ(bSHeB) by using eqs.(6, 11, 12). In the second





Proposition 2: Welfare eﬀect of LSPTA for given multilateral tariﬀs
If δS or δL =0the only self-enforcing solution is the Nash point. In a self-enforcing LSPTA ΩS =
δS
1−δSωS.M o r e o v e r ,i fδS ∈ (0,1) then eB > 0 ⇒ ΩS = HeB > 0 (proposition 1)
∴ ωS ≡ WS(τL,e S,τm)−WNS > 0,w h e r eWNS is Small’s payoﬀ under the Nash and WS(τL,e S,τm)
the payoﬀ under the LSPTA. Similarly for Large since ΩL ≤ δL
1−δLωL and ΩL = H
k (τT−τB(τT)) > 0.¤
Proposition 3: τEX ≥ τC
If large countries are suﬃciently patient s.t. neither ICEX nor ICC bind then the FOC in eqs.(15,16)
are necessary and suﬃcient to determine τEX and τC (since the respective second derivatives are





∂τT }|τEXm.W em u s tg e n e r a l l y
consider two cases, which we deﬁne as follows:• Case 1: LSPTA is not duty-free or is “just” duty-free at τT if τB(τT = τEXm) ≥ 0 ∧ τB(τT →
τEXm+) > 0
From implicit diﬀerentiation of either (τBI,e B)o r( τBII,e B)i np r o p o s i t i o n1w eo b t a i n∂τB/∂τT =1
and ∂eB/∂τT =0 .
∴ {WL
τL(1 − ∂τB
∂τT ) − WL
eS
∂eB
∂τT }|τEXm =0⇒ τEXm = τCm.
• Case 2: LSPTA is duty-free at τT if τB(τT = τEXm)=0∧ τB(τT → τEXm+)=0
From implicit diﬀerentiation of either (τBI,e B)o r( τBII,e B)i np r o p o s i t i o n1w eo b t a i n∂τB/∂τT =0
and ∂eB/∂τT = δS
k .T h u s {WL
τL(1 − ∂τB
∂τT ) − WL
eS
∂eB
















∂τT ) − WL
eS
∂eB
∂τT }|τEXm < 0 ⇒ τEXm > τCm.¤
Proposition 4: τEX < τWC
By deﬁnition at τEX, ΩEX(τEX)= δL
1−δLωEX(τEX) and τEX > τEXm if δL < δEX thus τEX > τCm.
Now, τEX < τWC if ΩWC(τEX) > δL
1−δLωWC(τEX). For this it is suﬃcient to establish that:
ΩWC(τEX) > ΩEX(τEX)
ωWC(τEX) < ωEX(τEX)
Using the deﬁnitions of the gains from deviation and WL (all τc evaluated at τEX):
ΩWC(τEX) − ΩEX(τEX)=( τB(τc) − τc)H/k + HαLλLΨ(bSHeB(τc))
> (τB(τc) − τc)H/k + δLHαLλLΨ(bSHeB(τc))
≥ 0
The ﬁrst inequality results because δL < 1 and Ψ > 0 if eB(τc) > 0. The last inequality follows from
proposition 1 since it requires ICL to be satisﬁed by a self-enforcing LSPTA with τT=τc.
Similarly, ωWC(τEX) < ωEX(τEX) since ωWC(τEX) − ωEX(τEX)=−(ΩWC(τEX) − ΩEX(τEX)).
∴ ΩWC(τEX) > ΩEX(τEX)= δL
1−δLωEX(τEX) > ωWC(τEX)= ⇒ τEX < τWC.¤









τm {WL(τL = τB(τNL),e S = eB(τNL),τm,τm∗,.)}
τN ≡ argmax




















τL}τm=τNm (23)• Case 1: τB(τT = τNL) ≥ 0 ∧ τB(τT → τNL+) > 0













τ ,s i n c eτNL = pL(τm). Substituting in eq.(23) we obtain WL
τL(1 − pL
τ ) > 0 which implies
that if τT = τNL = pL(τNm) then τN > τNm.
• Case 2: τB(τT = τNL)=0∧ τB(τT → τNL+)=0











τL}τm=τNm which implies that if τT = τNL = pL(τNm) then τN ≥ τNm






















τ ] 6= ∅ since pL
τ ∈ (0,1).¤
Proposition 5: τEX > τSC
By deﬁnition at τEX, ΩEX(τEX)= δL
1−δLωEX(τEX) and τEX > τEXm if δL < δEX,t h u sτEX > τCm.
Following proposition 4 we prove τEX > τSC by ﬁnding the suﬃcient condition such that:
ΩSC(τEX) < ΩEX(τEX)
ωSC(τEX) > ωEX(τEX)
We need only show when ωSC(τEX) > ωEX(τEX) since ΩC(τEX) − ΩEX(τEX)=−(ωC(τEX) −
ωEX(τEX)). Adding and subtracting both WL(τL = τNm,0,τNm,τNm∗
,.) and
WL(τB(τc),e B(τNL),τc,τm∗
= τc,.) we obtain (all τc evaluated at τEX):
ωSC(τEX) − ωEX(τEX)=ς + ² + %
ς = WL(τL = τNm,0,τNm,τNm∗
,.) − WL(τL = τN,0,τN,τN∗
,.)
² = WL(τB(τc),e B(τNL),τc,τm∗
= τc,.) − WL(τB(τc),e B(τc),τc,τm∗
= τc,.)
% = WL(τB(τNL),e B(τNL),τNm,τNm∗
,.) − WL(τB(τc),e B(τNL),τc,τm∗
= τc,.)
+WL(τL = τc,e B =0 ,τc,τm∗
= τc,.) − WL(τL = τNm,0,τNm,τNm∗
,.)
where ς represents the welfare eﬀect of changing all tariﬀsf r o mτNm to τN in the absence of LSPTAs;
² is the extra welfare from Small’s change in eS due to the increased threat tariﬀ in a trade war (from
τc to τNL); % represents changes in tariﬀ revenues from Small’s exports when diﬀerent tariﬀsa r e
used. We use two lemmas to prove that ² + % is always positive but ς ≥ 0 iﬀ τN ≥ τNm.
Lemma 2: ς ≥ 0 iﬀ τN ≥ τNm.
Proof:
• ∂
∂τmWL(τL = τm,e S =0 ,τm,τm∗ = τm,.) < (>)0 if τm > τCm (τm < τCm) from eq.(16) and
the concavity of WL(τL = τm,e S =0 ,τm,τm∗ = τm,.) in τm.
• τN > τCm : by comparing eqs.(16, 22) and noting WL
τm∗ < 0.• τNm > τEXm ≥ τCm:t h eﬁrst inequality follows from comparing eqs.(15, 21) and noting
WL
τm∗ < 0.The second from proposition 3.








Lemma 3: ² + %>0.
Proof:


















W h e r ew eu s ee q . ( 6 ) . F o r% the second equality follows after adding and subtracting τNLH/k and
the third from using ICS (proposition 1).
• Case 1: τB(τT = τc) ≥ 0 ∧ τB(τT → τc+) > 0
From proposition 1 eB(τc)=eB(τNL) if τNL > τc.M o r e o v e r ,τNL > τc because τNL = pL(τNm) >
τNm ≥ τc,t h eﬁrst inequality holds or otherwise Large* would not sell in Large (and autarky is not
a Nash equilibrium in this model) and the second because the repeated game improves cooperation
relative to the Nash.
∴ eB(τc)=eB(τNL) ⇒ ² =0and % = H
k (τNL− τNm) > 0.
• Case 2: τB(τT = τc)=0∧ τB(τT → τc+)=0






δS(eB(τc) − eB(τNL)) + HαLλL(Ψ(bSHeB(τNL)) − Ψ(bSHeB(τc))) > 0
V> 0 since
HαLλL(Ψ(bSHeB(τNL))−Ψ(bSHeB(τc)))
eB(τNL)−eB(τc) >H / δS. To see this note that eB(τNL) >




H/δS. Where the last inequality holds because WLeS











δS and the last
inequality must be true in any self-enforcing LSPTA with τT= τNL.
∴ V> 0 and τNL > τNm ⇒ ² + %>0.¤
Proposition 6: Eﬀect of deepening LSPTA on multilateral tariﬀs
We consider explicitly the eﬀect of αL,n o t i n gt h a tλL enters WL symmetrically. The two situations
of interest are:
A. τm = τEXm or τCm






















where the second line follows from the concavity of WL(τL = τB,e S = eB,τm,τm∗ = τm,.) in τm.
• Case 1: τB(τT = τEXm) ≥ 0 ∧ τB(τT → τEXm+) > 0
From proposition 1 ∂τB
∂τT =1 ,t h u s ∂
∂α(∂τB






∴ dτEXm/dα = dτCm/dα =0 .
• Case 2: τB(τT = τEXm)=0∧ τB(τT → τEXm+)=0
From proposition 1 ∂τB
∂τT =0and thus ∂
∂α(∂τB
∂τT )=0 .M o r e o v e r∂
∂α( ∂eB












∂τT )/∂α =( δS/k)∂(WL
eS)/∂α > 0 ⇒ dτEXm/dα >d τCm/dα =0 .
B. τm = τEX or τSC
From direct observation of ωSC and ΩSC it is obvious that dωSC(τc)/dα = dΩSC(τc)/dα =0 .
• Case 1: τB(τT = τEX) ≥ 0 ∧ τB(τT → τEX+) > 0.
We ﬁrst show that in this case the tariﬀ that is self-enforcing before α or λ increase remains self-
enforcing. Note that in this case the unconstrained optimum multilateral tariﬀ is unchanged and so is
the threat tariﬀ (shown above). For a given τT we have deB = −(δS/k)dτB (from ICS in proposition
1) and therefore deB/dα = −(δS/k)dτB/dα. Using this relationship and diﬀerentiating eq.(17) at





































α |eB(τEX) − WL
α |eB(τNL)
=0 (24)
where the last equality follows from eB(τEX)=eB(τNL) since τB(τT = τEX) ≥ 0 ∧ τB(τT →
τEX+) > 0 and τNL > τEX, i.e. higher threats are passed as higher τB at given eB. Similarly,
dΩEX/dα = −dωEX/dα =0 .
∴ dΩEX/dα = −dωEX/dα =0⇒ dτEX/dα = dτSC/dα =0 .
• Case 2: τB(τT = τEX)=0∧ τB(τT → τEX+)=0Now suppose that we start at a duty-free LSPTA so that at a given threat tariﬀ ∂τB
∂α = ∂eB
∂α =0 .




α |eB(τEX) − WL
α |eB(τNL)
= HλL(Ψ(bSHeB(τEX)) − Ψ(bSHeB(τNL))) < 0
The ﬁnal inequality is true iﬀ the LSPTA is duty-free, i.e. if τB(τT = τEX)=0∧ τB(τT → τEX+)=
0 s.t. eB(τEX) <e B(τNL). Similarly, dΩEX/dα = −dωEX/dα > 0.
∴ dΩEX/dα = −dωEX/dα > 0 ⇒ dτEX/dα >d τSC/dα =0 .¤
Proposition 7:Eﬀect of deepening LSPTA on Small’s welfare
















• Case 1: τB(τT = τEXm) ≥ 0 ∧ τB(τT → τEXm+) > 0
From the proof of proposition 6: dτm/dα =0and dτB/dα = − k
δS
deB

























ee > 0,s i n c eΨ00 < 0 and WL
eα = HbSHλLΨ0(bSHeB) > 0.














The inequality follows from δLkλLΨ(bSHeB) > 0 and k/δS > δLWL
e /WL
τL. To see the latter recall




τLδS. Now suppose that δL is such







at τBII. Therefore, this is also true for lower δL,i.e. when τBII and τBI do not coincide, since k/δS
is constant. If δL were higher then ICL would not bind and τBI would be the relevant solution.
∴ dWS
dα > 0.
• Case 2: τB(τT = τEX)=0∧ τB(τT → τEX+)=0Implicit diﬀerentiation of the FOC in proposition 1 when τB =0yields dτB





















From proposition 6 dτm
dα > 0 and
∴ dWS
dα ≥ 0 iﬀ pτ ≥ δS.¤
Proposition 8:Welfare ranking of regimes for Large
Rewriting the problem in eq.(14) by explicitly allowing LSPTAs under commitment we can show that
the equilibrium solution is still τm = τCm = τL and eS =0 .N o t et h a teB(τT)=δS
k (τT −τB(τT)) = 0
because the constraint τL = τc means both that τB(τT)=τc and τT cannot be higher than τc.
τCm ≡ argmax
τc {WL(τL = τB(τT),e S = eB(τT),τc,τm∗ = τc,.)) : ICC;τL = τc} (26)
When large countries are suﬃciently patient their IC in the MTL do not bind and the only diﬀerence
between τEXm in eq.(13) and the modiﬁed in eq.(26) is that in the latter the constraint τL = τc
binds because the LSPTA is welfare improving at any given multilateral tariﬀ.
∴Since eq.(26) and eq.(14) are equivalent we have WL(τEXm,.) >WL(τCm,.) for δS > 0.¤
Proposition 9: Welfare ranking of regimes for Small
We show that a necessary and suﬃcient condition for WEXS >WCS is:
δS < 1−









τ ) < 1 when the LSPTA at τEXm is duty-free
Moreover, δS <p L
τ is a suﬃcient condition for WEXS >WCS since min(1−
(τEXm−τCm)(1−pL
τ )
τEXm−τB(τEXm) ) ≥ pL
τ .













l (τEXm) − τB(τEXm) − (pL





l (τEXm) − pL




((τEXm − τB(τEXm))(1 − δS) − (τEXm − τCm)(1 − pL
τ ))
In the ﬁr s tl i n ew eu s ee q . ( 5 ) ;i nt h es e c o n dICS to substitute eB; in the third we add and subtract








∴ When the LSPTA is not duty-free at τEXm then τEXm = τCm
⇒ δS < 1 is necessary and suﬃcient for WEXS >WCS
∴ When τB(τEXm)=0then τEXm > τCm






τ ) ∈ (pτ,1) is necessary and suﬃcient for WEXS >
WCS and thus a δS ∈ (pτ,1) exist s.t. Small prefers the commitment regime.¤